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Abstract
We clarify the suﬃcient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of
Rachmilevitch (2013).
Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical
players are about to participate in an independent-private-value ﬁrst-price, sealed bid auction
for one indivisible object. After the risk-neutral players learn their valuations but prior to
the actual auction, player 1 can oﬀer a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) bribe to his opponent in
exchange for the opponent dropping out of the contest. If the oﬀer is accepted, player 1 is the
only bidder and obtains the item for free; otherwise, both players compete non-cooperatively
in the auction as usual. This is called the ﬁrst-price TIOLI game.1 R13 shows that under
the restriction to continuous and monotonic bribing strategies for player 1, any equilibrium
of this game must be trivial—the equilibrium bribing function employed by player 1, if it is
continuous and non-decreasing, must be identically zero. In this note, we clarify the suﬃcient
conditions under which a trivial equilibrium exists. These are less stringent than originally
proposed.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of players’ types (valuations). F is
atomless, has full support on [0,1], and its density is f. The following is Theorem 2 from
R13.
Theorem 2. Suppose that F is diﬀerentiable and that it satisﬁes 2F(t) + tf(t) ≥ 1 for all
t ∈ (0,1], where f = F ′. Then, the ﬁrst-price TIOLI game has a trivial equilibrium.
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1See R13 for a detailed description of the game. The inspiration for this game comes from Eső and
Schummer (2004), who study a second-price auction preceded by a bribing stage.
1An unfortunate fact regarding this theorem is that it is vacuously true.
Claim 1. There does not exist a distribution F such that 2F(t)+tf(t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ (0,1].
Proof. Suppose the contrary and choose 0 < ǫ < 1/2. Since F is continuous and F(0) = 0,
there exists ¯ t > 0 such that for all t < ¯ t, F(t) < ǫ. Thus, for all 0 < t < ¯ t, 2ǫ + tf(t) ≥ 1.
However, this implies that for t ∈ (0,¯ t), F(t) =
R t
0 f(x)dx ≥
R t
0
1−2ǫ
x dx = ∞, which is a
contradiction.
Fortunately, Theorem 2’s conclusion is true under a relatively weak alternative condition. All
that is required is that F is concave. The intuition is that when there is a high probability
that bidders have low valuations, player 1 does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to bribe player 2. This
is the same intuition as initially proposed by R13.
Theorem 2′. If F is concave, the ﬁrst-price TIOLI game has a trivial equilibrium.
To prove this theorem we ﬁrst establish a useful lemma using a geometric argument.
Lemma 1. Suppose b and x are two positive numbers such that b + x ≤ 1. Then
F(b)x + [F(b + x) − F(b)]b ≤
Z b+x
0
F(t)dt. (1)
Proof. We consider two cases. In case 1, suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ b. We make our argument with
reference to Figure 1a. In the ﬁgure,
R b+x
0 F(t)dt is the region below the thick curve, F(t),
to the left of b+x. The left-hand side of (1), F(b)x+[F(b + x) − F(b)]b, equals the shaded
region, or A+B+C +D. Since F is concave and therefore F(x) ≥ F(b+x)−F(b), it easily
follows that Y ≥ B. Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that X ≥ C. By concavity of F, D ≥ C.
Finally,
D =
Z b+x
b
F(t) − F(b)dt =
Z x
0
F(t + b) − F(b)dt ≤
Z x
0
F(t)dt = X.
Hence, X ≥ D ≥ C as required.
For case 2, suppose 0 ≤ b ≤ x. The situation is as in Figure 1b. Again it is suﬃcient to
show that D ≤ X. This inequality follows since
D =
Z b+x
x
F(t) − F(x)dt =
Z b
0
F(x + t) − F(x)dt ≤
Z b
0
F(t)dt = X.
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Figure 1: The geometric argument in Lemma 1. Figures not to scale.
We can now prove Theorem 2′ by adapting the argument from the proof of Theorem 2
in R13.
Proof of Theorem 2′. Consider the following strategy proﬁle. Player 1 oﬀers a bribe of
zero independent of his type. If this bribe is rejected, he bids as in the one-shot, symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the ﬁrst-price auction. Irrespective of type, player 2
rejects a bribe of zero and post-rejection bids as in the symmetric BNE of the auction. Player
2 accepts the bribe of b > 0 if and only if his valuation θ2 ≤ b. If player 2 rejects the bribe
b > 0, he believes that player 1 is bidding (θ2−b), and he bids (θ2−b)+.2 In this case, player
1 is prescribed his optimal bid in this post-rejection-of-b information set (it is easy to show
that such a best-response exists).
It is suﬃcient to verify that player 1 does not have a proﬁtable deviation to a strictly
positive bribe. Let b > 0 be the bribe oﬀered by player 1 and let x be player 1’s bid in the
auction following the (possible) rejection of b by player 2. Obviously, we can assume that
x ≤ 1 − b.3 Given the prescribed (oﬀ-equilibrium path) behavior of player 2, the expected
2The bid r+ is identical to the bid r, except that it wins for sure if the competing bid is r′ ≤ r. See R13
for the details.
3If player 2 rejects the sure payoﬀ b, then optimality dictates that he does not bid more than θ2 − b in
the auction; therefore, player 1 has no reason to bid strictly above 1 − b.
3payoﬀ of player 1 is
Π(b,x|θ1) = F(b)(θ1 − b) + [F(b + x) − F(b)](θ1 − x). (2)
On the equilibrium path, the expected payoﬀ of bidder 1 of type θ1 is π(θ1) =
R θ1
0 F(t)dt. It
is suﬃcient to verify that for all θ1 and for all 0 < b ≤ θ1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 − b, it is the case
that Π(b,x|θ1) ≤ π(θ1). Let ψ(θ1) ≡ π(θ1)−Π(b,x|θ1). Note that ψ′(θ1) = F(θ1)−F(b+x),
so ψ has a minimum at θ1 = b + x. Also, Π(b,x|b + x) = F(b)x + [F(b + x) − F(b)]b. By
Lemma 1, ψ(b + x) ≥ 0. Therefore, ψ ≥ 0. Put diﬀerently, π(θ1) − Π(b,x|θ1) ≥ 0 for all θ1.
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